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Ethical Dilemma of Self-Driving Cars:
Conservative Solution
Christian Servin, Vladik Kreinovich, and Shahnaz Shahbazova

Abstract When designing software for self-driving cars, we need to make an important decision: When a self-driving car encounters an emergency situation in which
either the car’s passenger or an innocent pedestrian have a good change of being
injured or even die, which option should it choose? This has been a subject of many
years of ethical discussions – and these discussions have not yet led to a convincing
solution. In this paper, we propose a “conservative” (status quo) solution that does
not require making new ethical decisions – namely, we propose to limit both the
risks to passengers and risks to pedestrians to their current levels, levels that exist
now and are therefore acceptable to the society.

1 Formulation of a Problem
Self-driving cars are expected to be safer than human drivers. Self-driving cars
are supposed to provide maximum safety both for the passengers of this car and for
all other folks – passengers of other cars, pedestrians, and passers-by. In the nearest
future, they are expecting to provide higher level of safety for all these categories
than cars operated by human drivers.
Unfortunate situations, while hopefully very rare, cannot be completely
avoided. No matter how safe self-driving cars will be, unfortunate situations may
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still happen, and in such situations, it may not be possible to make everyone safe. For
example, if several pedestrians suddenly rush across the road, there may be enough
time to stop the car, so the only choices are either hit the pedestrians or swerve this
potentially hurting the car’s passenger(s) and maybe even passengers of nearby cars.
In such situations, what a car will do depends on what algorithm we program into
it, and this, in turn, depends on what objective function we use when designing this
algorithm; for related discussions, see, e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30] and references
therein.
Seemingly reasonable idea: social good. At first glance, when designing selfdriving cars, we should maximize the overall social good, or, equivalently, minimize the overall social harm. From this viewpoint, if the choice is to harm (or even
kill) one passenger or three pedestrians, the proper solution seems to be to harm the
smallest number of people – i.e., in this situation, to possibly harm the passenger
while trying to avoid harming the pedestrians.
This idea is not as reasonable as it may seem. A detailed analysis, however, shows
that such arguments may be oversimplifying and not as reasonable as they may
sound at first glance. Following one of the examples proposed by researchers, suppose that a medical doctor in a small town sees a reasonable healthy patient with a
healthy heart, healthy liver, and two healthy kidneys, and he/she knows that in this
town, there are four patients at risk of dying if they do not get, correspondingly, a
new heart, a new liver, and a new kidney. Is is reasonable to kill the first patient
and transplant his/her organs to the four dying folks? The argument is the same –
shall we save the life of one patient or four patients? However, in this example, the
answer to harm the smallest number of people does not seem so reasonable.
To make it even less reasonable, suppose that the first patient is not fully heathy,
but had a bad cut and is heavily bleeding – so the patient can die if no medical help
is available. Shall the doctor save this patient and let the other four die or shall the
doctor save the lives of the four other patients by not attending to the first one?
So what shall we do? This seems like a complex problem for which we need
philosophers to argue and to come up with a convincing solution. However, the fact
that the philosophers have been discussing this “trolley problem” for many years –
probably for many decades – and have not yet come with a convincing solution is,
to us, an indication that we should not expect such a solution in the nearest future
either. We have to come up with such a solution ourselves.
What we do in this paper. In this paper, we argue that such a convincing solution
is possible – namely, the solution is to be conservative and to follow the society’s
accepted norms and practices.
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2 How to Solve the Problem: Main Idea
We must be fair to the passenger. At present, a passenger in a car has a certain
degree of safety. Some of this safety is provided by technical innovations such as
safe and robust car design, airbags, and automatic warnings that inform the driver
that another car is too close. Some of the safety is provided by the fact that the driver
is in control, and the driver’s skills – and the self-preservation instinct – provide
safety in complex situations where technical innovations alone cannot help.
It is clearly not fair to the driver if the self-driving cars would provide a smaller
degree of safety for the passenger than the degree of safety obtained when this person drives the car. Technological progress is supposed to make all our lives better,
not provide advantage to some groups at the expense of others.
We must be fair to others. Similarly, the self-driving cars should provide at least
the same level of safety to passengers in other cars, to pedestrians, and to the passersby, as the current human-driven car.
If the self-driving cars focus only on the safety of their own passengers, this will
make it even less probable than now that the car will try to swerve to avoid hitting
the pedestrian. In such situation, the increased safety of the passenger will come at
the expense of the decreased safety for the passenger.
We must be fair to pedestrians, we must sure that in all situations, their level of
safety is at least as high as their current level of safety, in situations when cars are
driven by human drivers.
The resulting idea. This fairness is our main idea. Specifically, in situations when
the car has the option of either harm its passenger or several pedestrians, it should
not be concerned only about the passenger – thus increasing the risk to the pedestrian, and it should not follow the naively understood social good track idea – this
increasing the risk to the passenger. Instead, the car should select proper probabilities of both possible actions – the action that potentially hurts the passenger and the
action that potentially hurts the pedestrians – in such a way that for both groups, the
level of safety be at least as high as for the current human-driven cars.

3 How to Solve the Problem: Details
What should be the balance between the safety of the passenger and the safety
of others. In general, our recommendation is to make sure that the passenger is
as safe as when he/she would be driving the car, and others – pedestrians and bystanders – would be at least as safe as when humans drive cars. However, within
these two restrictions, there are many possible options. For example:
• if we are pursuing social good idea, we can keep the passenger exactly as safe as
when cars are driven by people, and place all the efforts into minimizing the risk
for others;
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• on the other hand, if we allow customers to select which self-driving cars to
buy, customers will naturally want to buy a car that minimizes their risk – while
keeping the risk to others at the current level.
Instead of decreasing just one of these risks – risk to the passenger and risk to others
– we could try to somewhat decrease both risks. Which strategy should we follow?
How should we balance these two risks?
Our idea. Instead of trying to solve a difficult-to-solve (and maybe even impossibleto-solve) ethical problem, why not just follow what people have been doing – and
what therefore is socially acceptable? Namely, we can find how the two risks decreased with time and thus, find out what was, in the past, the relation between the
two risks – as measured, e.g., by the percentages pd and pw of harmful accidents
per hour of driving (or being driven) and walking.
In general, these probabilities decrease with time. So, by observing these probabilities pd,i and pw,i at different historic epochs i, we can find the dependence between these two values, i.e., a function f (p) for which pd,i ≈ f (pw,i ) for all i. This
function reflects a socially acceptable balance between the two risks. Thus, in the
future, when it will be possible to have self-driving cars that decrease both risks, a
natural idea is to use the values pd and pw for which pd = f (pw ). This will provide
a socially acceptable way to balance the risks.
Caution. Of course, what we propose is what medical doctors call a palliative – a
temporary solution that is used in lieu of a better one. At this moment, in the absence
of a better more convincing solution, this is what we propose: to follow the current
balance between the risks when designing self-driving cars.
This does not mean, of course, that this conservative solution – based on the
current and past social understanding – is the only way to go.
• Social moors and opinions have changed many times in the past, they will undoubtedly change again and again, and what is acceptable now will no longer be
acceptable – just like the risk level of the original cars is not acceptable nowadays, and if someone wants to drive an ancient car, that car has to be retrofitted
with modern safety devices.
• Maybe someone will come up with a convincing solution to the ethical dilemma.
In all these cases, better solutions will be accepted. However, as of now, in the
absence of such better solutions, the proposed conservative idea seems to be a reasonable way to proceed.
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